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ABSTRACT
Theinterdependence between the optimal degree ofwage indexation and optimal monetary
policy is analyzed for a small open economy undera variety of assumptions regarding: (i)
relative information available to privateagents and the stabilization authority; (ii) theper-
ceived nature of the disturbances impingingon the economy. The distinctions between: (a)
unanticipated and anticipated disturbances, and (b)permanent and transitory disturbances,
are emphasized. The extent to which stabilization is achievedis shown to depend upon the
nature of the disturbances and the available information.The policy redundancy issue is









Recent research in international macroeconomics has emphasized the interdependence
between the degree of wage indexation and the choice of exchange rate regime fromthe
viewpoint of optimal stabilization policy. Authors such as Marston (1982), Flood and Marion
(1982), among others, have shown how: (i) the choice between fixed and flexible exchange
rate systems depends upon the degree of wage indexation; (ii) the choice of the optimal degree
of wage indexation depends upon the exchange rate regime.1
More recently, Turnovsky (1983) and Aizenman and Frenkel (1985) have begunto take
a more integrated approach to the question of the optimal stabilization of anopen economy,
by analyzing general rules for wage indexation and monetary policy. These authors focuson
the tradeoffs between these as stabilization instruments, and their approach is directedat the
design of overall, integrated, stabilization policy 'packages.' Takingmonetary policy to be in
the form of exchange market intervention, Turnovsky showed how thedegree of intervention
impinges on the effectiveness of wage indexation, and vice versa. Full indexation ofwages to
prices renders exchange market intervention ineffective in stabilizing output. At thesame
time, intervention resulting in an accommodation of the domesticmoney supply precisely
equal to the change in the demand for money due to movements in the exchangerate, makes
wage indexation become totally ineffective.2 Aizenman and Frenkel consider the joint deter-
mination of optimal indexation and optimal monetary policyamong more general forms of
monetary policy rules. Their analysis stresses the relationship between the number of
independent pieces of information regarding the sources of stochastic disturbancesimpinging
on the economy and the number of independent policy parameters.
The optimal policy literature deals almost exclusively with stabilizing white noise distur-
bances; i.e., the stochastic shocks impinging on the economy are unanticipated, transitory and
are independently distributed over time.3 In practice, the distinction between permanent and
transitory disturbances, on the one hand, and anticipated and unanticipated disturbances,on2
the other, is an extremely important one. Different types of disturbances arereflected dif-
ferently in the economy and require different policy responses. Someof these have been con-
sidered for monetary rules by Turnovsky (1984).
This paper addresses the interdependence between optimal monetary policy and optimal
wage indexation in an economy in which the exogenousdisturbances may be of a quite gen-
eral type. The situation we envisage is an economy in which one-period wage contracts are
signed in each period. These contracts introduce rigidities into the economyand the purpose
of the monetary and wage indexation rules is to attempt to eliminate these rigiditiesand to
replicate the behavior of a frictionless economy.
We assume that there are two types of random disturbances impinging on the economy.
An important element in our analysis concerns the availability of information on thesevari-
ables. First, there are price and financial variables, information on which is available to all
agents instantaneously. Secondly, there are real and monetary shocks,which may or may not
be observed contemporaneously. Indeed, we shall show how both the form of the optimal
rules and, in some cases the ability to replicate the frictionless economy, depends critically
upon the availability of information to agents in the economy.
2. THE FRAMEWORK
This section outlines the analytical framework. To minimize details, a simple model will
be employed. We consider a small open economy which produces and consumes a single
traded good. We also assume a single traded bond, with the domestic bond market being per-
fectly integrated with that in the rest of the world. Thus purchasing power parity (PPP)and
uncovered interest parity (UIP) are assumed to hold.
A. Availability of Information
A key feature of our analysis concerns the availability of information. Our characteriza-
tion of this is illustrated in Fig. 1, considered from the viewpoint of time t,whichwe partition3
into the infinitesimally short sub-period (t, t+).
At time t-l, a contract is signed for thewage at time t, this being determined on the basis
of expectations formed at time t-l. Prices and financial variablesare assumed to be observed
instantaneously by all agents, so that everyone has complete current informationon these vari-
ables when they make their respective decisions. Morespecifically, these instantaneously
observed variables include:
(i) the domestic and foreign interest rates;
(ii) the exchange rate;
(iii) the domestic price leveL
Given PPP, (ii) and (iii) imply the observability of theforeign price level as well.
At time t, two sets of decisions are made. First, thereare policy decisions; i.e., the
implementation of the wage indexation andmonetary policy rules. Here we assume, largely
for expositional simplicity, that wage indexation is conductedby a public authority, as indeed
is the case in countries such as Israel and Australia. Thishas the advantage of enabling us to
identify all stabilization activities as being conducted bya public authority. Secondly, there
are the decisions of the private agents in theeconomy, which include the production, port-
folio, and consumption decisions, as well as the formation of forecastsfor the next period. We
assume that these two sets of decisions are made in the aboveorder, at instances we denote by
t, t+, respectively. This means that the actual indexedwage, which is determined at time t, is
known by the time the production decision is made at thenext instant of time, t+.
This distinction in effect differentiates the informationavailable to the public and
private agents in the economy. It is possible to make further distinctionsamong the various
private agents along the lines of Canzonerj, Henderson, andRogoff (1983). For example, one
can allow investors, who form predictions of the future exchangerate, to have different infor-
mation from individuals concerned with predicting prices in thedetermination of the wage
contract. And their information may differ from that of producers. Wedo not pursue these4
refinements here.
The key informational issue concerns the observability of the domestic monetarydistur-
bance, utsay,and the domestic productivity disturbance, Vgsay.Under our assumptions, three
different informational situations exist
(1) ut,vare observed instantaneously at time t by both public and private agents.
As we shall show, this full information assumption is in effect the information structure con-
sidered by Karni (1983) and indeed, we shall obtain a modified form of his indexation rule as
one optimal policy.4
(ii) u, Vtareobserved in the time interval (t, t+). They are therefore unobserved
by the stabilization authority, but known to private agents.
This asymmetric information assumption is made throughout much of the literature; see e.g.
Gray (1976), Canzoneri (1982), Turnovsky (1983), and several of the papersin Bhandari
(1985).
(iii) Ut,Vg areobserved after time t+. They are therefore unknown to both public
and private agents at the time decisions for time t are made.
In this case, agents form estimates of Ut,vat time t, as required for production or forecasting
decisions, by utilizing information on the observed financial variables. This information struc-
ture is again symmetric between public and private agents and is the one adopted byAizen-
man and Frenkel (1985).
B. The Demand Side





=priceof domestic output, expressed in logarithms,
=priceof foreign output, expressed in logarithms,
E =exchangerate, expressed in logarithms,
=forecastof E+1, formed at time t,
=foreignnominal interest rate,
=domesticoutput, expressed in logarithms,
u= stochasticdisturbance in the demand for money.
These equations are standard. Equation (I) describes PPP; equation(2) specifies UIP; equa-
tion (3) describes equilibrium in the domestic monetary sector.
C.The SupplySide
Thesupply function is based on the one-period wage contract model. Weassume that
the contract wage for time t is determined at time t- I such that,given expectations of firms
and workers, the labor market is expected to clear. The informationset upon which the con-
tract is based includes all financial and price variables up till andincluding time t—l; i.e., all
past stochastic disturbances. It may, or may not, include the actual disturbancesoccurring at
that time. In terms of our timing scheme, the contract for time t issigned at time (t —1 )+.
Theexpected supply of labor at the contract wage is
N',_1 =n(W:,_1—P..1) n >0 (4)
where
N',_1 =expectedsupply of labor formed at time t-l, for time t, expressed in loga-
rithms,
W_ =contractwage, determined at time t-l for time t, expressed in logarithms,
=forecastof P formed at time t-I.6
Output is produced by means of a Cobb-Douglas production function
Y=(1—0)Nt+v O<G<1 (5)
where
N =employmentof labor, expressed in logarithms,
Vt =stochasticdisturbance in productivity.
The expected demand for labor, N_1, (based on expected profit maximization), is deter-
mined by the marginal productivity condition
in(1—0) —0N_1+ = — P_1 (6)
The contract wage is determined by equating the expected demand and supply of labor
in(1) and (5),yielding




Thecontract wage therefore depends upon the expected productivity disturbance as well as
the expected price level.
Actual employment is assumed to be determined by the short-run marginal productivity
condition, after the actual wage and price are known. This is expressed by
1n(1—9)—9N ÷E(v)=W—P (8)
Note that we have introduced the instantaneous forecast of the productivity disturbance,
denoted by E(v), into the optimality condition (8). This allows for the possibility that firms
do not observe this disturbance instantaneously.5 If it is observed, then E(v) =v;otherwise
they must infer it from available information on current observable variables, using a forecast-
ing technique we discuss below. Combining (5) and (8), current output is given by,
=(1±) ln(l—0)+ (---)(P —W)+ + Vt (9)
whichdepends upon both the firm's estimate of v and v itself. In the event that v iS7




In the situation that the productivity disturbance is observedinstantaneously, the
optimal form of the wage indexation rule will become immediatelyapparent and will be dis-
cussed later. Otherwise, we assume that wages are indexed in accordancewith the simple rule
W =W +r(P —P1) (10)
where r is the indexation parameter to be determined.Combining (10) and (7) with (9) or (9'),
yields the following alternative forms of supply functions, whichcorrespond to the observabil-
ity or otherwise of the productivity disturbance,
=(1nlI-9)+ (1-r)(-1-)(p -P1)+ (--)
{E(vt)
-"' } +v (11)
=_8)iilii(1—9)+ (l—r)(--)(P —P_1)+ —(.L) (11')
E. Monetary Policy Rule
In the case that the monetary authorities observe all disturbancesinstantaneously, the
optimal rule becomes self-evident. Otherwise, we assume that themonetary authorities adjust
the money supply in accordance with observed movements in thefinancial and price variables
=z1E +v2Rg + '3t+ Z'4Pt
Using the PPP condition (1) and the UIP condition (3), this equationcan be expressed as8
M = + ,h2Eti,t+tL3f2t + 4Q
Notethat the money supply is assumed to be adjusted to a wider range of piecesof
information than are wages. This reflects the prevailing practice of wage indexation being res-
tricted to price movements. If, in addition, wages are assumed to be indexed tothe foreign
price level, nothing additional is gained as long as the money supplyis adjusted to the foreign
price level as well. There is a tradeoff betweenand the corresponding coefficient in the
wage indexation rule.
We wiii argue below that wage indexation is inessential. The optimum we achieve can
always be obtained by monetary policy alone. In some cases, it canalso be achieved by a
comprehensively based wage indexation scheme. But this is not always so. In one important
case, monetary policy is always required to achieve the optimal degreeof stability.
F. The Frictionless Economy
Wage contracts introduce rigidities into the economy, leading to welfare lossesrelative to
a frictionless economy in which wages are fully flexible. The purposeof stabilization policy is
to attempt to 'undo' these, thereby replicating as closely as possible the outputof a frictionless
economy, and minimizing these resulting welfare losses. Itis well known that the supply of
output in such an economy is given by
Y(= 'ln(1—9)+ (13)





The output level of the frictionless economy thus serves as a benchmark, with the stabilization
objective being to minimize the variance of Y about Y(.69
G. The Complete Model
The above components can now be combined to yield thefollowing summary of the
economy. It is expressed in deviation form, about an initial equilibrium, these deviations
being denoted by lower case letters. Thus we obtain
Pt =q+e (14a)
m —Pt=iYt—a2[wt + —e]+Ut (14b)
=u1e+ +/23Wt + p4qt (14c)
*
1—9 Yt =(—i.——) (l—r)[(e
—e,_1)+(q
—
qt,t—i)]+E(v)— + vt (l4d)
Yf (°E(v) + v (14e)
Allexpectations are assumed to be rational
x, =E(x.)s>t
whereE is the expectations operator, conditional on information availableat time t. Note
that in the case that v is observed instantaneously to privateagents, E(v) =v,and (14d) and
(1 4e) are amended appropriately. Also, in writing the supply functionas in (1 4d), the one
period conditional expectation of (14a) has been taken and substituted.Finally, we should
emphasize that our notation (t, t+) introduced above is to parameterize theinformation sets
available to the agents in the economy. All variables in the infinitesimaltime interval (t, H.)
are determined simultaneously.
3. GENERAL SOLUTION
The reduced form system (14) is a standard rational expectationsmacro model. The
solution procedures are familiar, enabling our description to be brief.10
First, we consider the observability of the stochastic disturbancesimplied by the obser-
vability of the financial variables and prices. With mt being adjustedin accordance with a
known rule in response to observed variables, mt —Pt15 observed at time t. Substituting for
output from (14d) into (14b), we have
*
1—8 *




— +(u + ajvt)
The quantities et, qt, qtt—i, E(v), v_1, r, are all observed attime t, enabling us to
deduce the value of the composite disturbance (Ut + aivt). Thus assumingthat u, Vt are
uncorrelated, the optimal estimates of u, v, obtained from the observedcomposite distur-
bance, are given by the least squares predictors
a2
E(u) =22 2(Ut + (16a)
o + a1a0
a
Et(vt) =22 2(Ut + aivt) (l6b)
o + a1a
where o-, o are the variances of u, v respectively.




The conditional expectations for time t+j, formed at time t, are
• a1(l +n) *
= Ut÷j,t +
1+nO Vj,g+ (1—/h4)qt-1-j,t — (a2 ÷ p3)wt.,t j = 0,1,2,...(18)
The instantaneous forecast, zdependsupon the observability of u, v. In general, we have11
* a1 E(z) =E(u)+ E(v) + (1— — (a2 + /23)(JJt I
(18') — 9)n = ;+
+[E(v)
—Vt]
with z =;, when Vt iS observed.
Substituting (14a), (14c), (14d) into (14b) andtakingconditional expectations, yields the
following difference equation in exchange rate expectations:
(a2 + h2) et+i,t —(1—+ a2) et,t = zt,ti = 1,2,... (19)






{(1 -r[_et*g1 + (qt -q-1)]+ Et(Vt)_;iJ
(20)
+(1 — r) {_Z + ( + a2) e;1 + [v — Et(vt)}J
wherei i—s + a2 + a1( 1 )(1 —r).Theexchangerateexpectations etj,tand e_1 are
obtainedbysolving(19)and are given by712
eti,t =—





1 1 —pi +a2 jifIiPi+a2< for alit(21b)
a2 + P2j0 a2 + P2 a2 + P2I
where is defined by (18), (18).8 Furthermore, setting i =1in (19) (at time t-1), using
(18'), and substituting into (20), the deviation in output can be written equivalently as:




+ (1 + a2 —.) (1
—r)(q —qt,t—i)+1 +
This equation indicates that the deviation in output from the frictionless level depends upon
revisions to forecasts made between time t-1 and time t in response to new information. In
the case of observed variables, such as q, this is the unanticipated change in that variable. In
the case of exchange rate expectations, it is the update in the forecast for time t÷1, between
time t- 1 and time t.
Our analysis below includes two important cases. The first is where all disturbances are
unanticipated and transitory, so that
=0for all t (22)
The second is where the expectations of the composite variable z formed at time t are uniform
throughout all future periods. Formally, this is described by
z.j,t=say,i =1,2,,for all t (23)13
In particular, we consider the important case where the current disturbancein zisexpected
to be permanent so that z= E(z).Inthis case, the stable solution for exchange rateexpec-
tations both simplify to
* __________ = z=1,2,...,forall t (24) — —
4.FULL INFORMATION
Stabilization when both private agents and the stabilizationauthority have complete
information on all random disturbances, includingu, Vt,isstraightforward, either by means of
wage indexation or monetary policy.
Subtracting (13') from (9'), using (7), and writing the resulting expression indeviation





so that Yt =yf,the frictionless level, provided wages are indexed in accordancewith
w = + (Pt—Pt'..j)+ [Vt — v.1J (26)
That is, wages should be fully indexed to the unanticipatedchange in price and partially
indexed to the unanticipated component of theproductivity shock. Full indexation to the
price change alone yields perfect stabilization if and only if theproductivity disturbance is
fully anticipated. Equation (26) may be rewritten as
* I * w=w+(pPt,t—i) ++ [yYt,t—i] (27)
with the rule now being expressed in terms of unanticipatedmovements in output. This rule
is essentially equivalent to the Karni (1983) stabilizationrule, which dealt with unanticipated
disturbances.14









Equations (26) and (28) provide alternative methods for replicating the outputof the
frictionless economy. Each of these offers advantages. The wage indexation scheme involves
monitoring fewer pieces of information, although it does involve formulating forecastsof the
productivity disturbance. On the other hand, the monetary rule requires more information,
but observations on only current disturbances. Moreover, the authority need not attempt to
determine whether a disturbance is permanent or transitory. Its nature will be reflected by
movements in the (observed) interest rate. Finally, eliminating Pt between (26) and (28) yields
a tradeoff between the adjustment in money supply and the wage rate.
5. UNANTICIPATED DISTURBANCES
We now return to equation (20) and determine the optimal monetary policy and wage
indexation schemes in situations where there is incomplete information. The optimal policy
rules are summarized in Table 1. The first •row of that table deals with Case (ii), where
private agents, but not the stabilization authority, observe the demand and productivity distur-
bances Ut,v;the second row describes Case (iii) where neither the private agents not the sta-
bilization authority observe Ut,v.The two columns of the table pertain respectively to white
noise disturbances and to disturbances which, having occurred, are then perceived as being
permanent.
These optimal policies are determined as follows. Depending upon the disturbance,
etj,t, e_1 are calculated from (21) and substituted into (20). The policy parameters, ii,,and15
r, are chosen to minimize var (y —yf).
A. White Noise Disturbances
For white noise disturbances all expectations are zero, so from (22)
e..jt =ett...j=0
Thus, substituting into (20')
11—9 E(v) Yt =-( ) —r)E(z)+(l +a2—j.t)(I—r)qj +
=l






Notethat the solution is independent of the monetary policy parameter Thisis because
for white noise disturbances, e41 =0.It is evident from (29) that the values of the optimal
policy parameters which minimize var (y —yf)can be obtained recursively. First, the effects
of the foreign variables q, w can be neutralized by setting their respective coefficients in
(29) to zero; then the remaining variance due to the domestic variablesu, v, can be minim-
ized.
Full wage indexation is non-optimal, since when r =1,(29) reduces to
1—9 Vt
9i+no
rendering monetary policy ineffective for further variance reduction. Instead, the effects of
the foreign variables can be eliminated by setting the optimal monetary policyparameters
(denoted by n)16
/23= —a2 (30a)
/24= 2 + (30b)
With the foreign variables eliminated, (29) simplifies to






The remaining choice is that of r, j,andthis depends critically upon whether or not vt is
observed.
If v is observed, then E (vi) =v,and it is easy to show that only one of the remaining







EQuation(31) implies a tradeoff between the degree of wage indexation and the extent to
which monetary policy should respond to exchange rate movements. Either r orcan be
chosen arbitrarily, with the other being determined by this relationship. The values r =1,
=(1+a1)are ruled out for reasons established previously by Turnovsky (1983) and noted
above in Section 1. From (31) we see
d1—>0 Adr
so that if wages are more fully indexed to prices, then the money supply should be expanded17
more (or contracted less) to a depreciation in the exchange rate.
Substituting (30a), (30b) into (14c) and using the PPP and UIP relationships, the optimal





where ,, arelinked by (31). Written in this way, both optimal policy rules have thecon-
venience of enabling the domestic policy makers to monitor only domestic variables. Inpar-
ticular, one component of the optimal monetary rule requires accommodation to movements in
the demand for money arising from changes in the interest rate. If =0,the optimum can be
reached through monetary policy alone, withbeing set in accordance with (31)?
Turning now to the case where uandv are not observed by private agents, we have
from (16b)
E(v) =(U + cv) (33)
in which case (29') becomes
Yt11(19)-r)+
(29")
(1 +a2—p1)—(l —r)a1(1 —9)n
+ (u + czjv)
The optimal policy parameters, j, ,obtainedby setting the coefficient of the composite dis-
turbance (u + ajv) to zero in (29) now satisfy
(1 +a2—1)
=(1 —) 1+a1(1 —8)ni
(34) l+n9 1+n9
which again implies a positive tradeoff between them. In thiscase, the slope is steeper than
before, implying that for a given degree of indexation, a greatermonetary expansion (smaller18
monetary contraction) is required in response to a given depreciationin the exchange rate.
Substituting (30a), (30b) into (14c) and using the PPP and UIP conditions, the optimal policy
rules are again given by (32a), (32b), except the tradeoff between )andi is now given by
(34).
There is, however, a critical difference between these two cases. When private agents
observe Utandv, the optimal stabilization rule, based on incomplete information,is unable to
replicate the output of the frictionless economy. In effect, the inferior information available to
the stabilization authority prevents it from being able to track the behavior of a private fric-
tionless economy perfectly. There is therefore some residual, positive var (Yt —yl).By con-
trast, when these disturbances are not observed by private agents, the optimal rules,with j, ?,
satisfying(34) imply Yt =y(.With equal (imperfect) information to that of the private sector,
the stabilization authority is able to replicate exactly the behavior of a frictionless economy.
The latter is precisely the result obtained by Aizenman and Frenkel (1985).
B. Perceived Permanent Disturbances
Suppose now that the disturbances occurring at each point of time t have been previ-
ously unanticipated, but having occurred are now perceived as being permanent. Thus
qtt—i =qg_j,v.4= E_1(v_1)and =E(z)for all jandt. Thus exchange rate expecta-
tions are generated by
• E(z) =— (35a)
1 —— I'2
• E_1(z_1) =— (35b)
— —
whereE(z) is given by (18').
Substituting these expressions for expectations into (20'), the solution for y —v1is given
by19








From (36) we can obtain the expressions for the optimal policies reported in the second
column of Table 1.
In the case where private agents, but not the stabilization authority, observeUt, and v,
we see by inspection that Yt is stabilized perfectly at the frictionless level, yf, for all t, by set-
ting p =(1+ a2). The optimal policy rules are therefore
=(1+ a2)e + p2etjt + + /24qt (37a)
wt =w'+1(p Ptt—i) (37b)
where /22 /23, /24, 1, are all arbitrary, the only restriction being rl. This is a generalization of
the result obtained by Turnovsky (1984) in the absence of wage indexation.
To understand the economic reasoning underlying this result, consider the domestic
money market. Combining equations (14a), (14b) yields
mg =qg÷ et + ajyt— a2[wt+ —e]+ Ut (38)
If the domestic monetary authority intervenes in accordance with (37a), it follows from(35a)
(and the assumption that u, v are observed by private agents) that
* 1 a1(1+n) et+i,g = Ut+ Vt —(a2+ /23)t + (1 — (39) 1+n9
Exchange rate expectations adjust in response to the disturbances in ut, Vt,w' and q. The
resulting adjustment in the domestic interest rate is precisely such as to eliminate the effects
of the disturbances u, w and q from the excess demand for nominalmoney balances. This
can be seen by substituting (39) and (37a) into (38):20





It is clear from this equation that whatever arbitrary values of j, ji and /Z4 are chosen, the
expected exchange rate, given by the term in parentheses, simply adjusts to offset these sto-






thereby verifying that income is stabilized at its frictionless level.
It is interesting to note that in contrast to the white noise disturbances discussed above,
the stabilization authority having incomplete information, can nevertheless replicate the
equilibrium of a frictionless economy in response to this type of disturbance. It can dispense
with wage indexation, and in fact, in the light of the PPP and UIP conditions, the optimal
monetary rule can be expressed in a number of equivalent ways, e.g.,
m =(1+c2)e;m =(1+a2)p;m =(1÷ a2)r
The most convenient form will presumably depend upon the availability and reliability of the
necessary information.
The situation where private agents do not observe Ut,v,leads to two sets of optimal
policy rules, both of which yield perfect stabilization at the frictionless Output level, for all t.
Since (36) does not depend upon the observability of Ut,v,one optimal policy is obviously
=(1+ a2), again giving rise to (37a), (37b).
The term in parentheses in (36) can be written in terms of the differences and
(u + cXlVt) The second set of policy rules is obtained by setting the coefficients of these ran-
dom variables to zero, thereby setting the right-hand side of (36) to zero. The resulting
optimum is similar, but not identical to, that obtained previously. Specifically, J =—a2,
/34= +with,, ?,being arbitrary, but subject to the constraint21
(1/h1/h2) Aaj(l—O)n9 =(l —r)[1 + ] 1+nO l+nO
If further, we choose=—a2,then this second set of policy rules reduces to (32a), (32b),
with the tradeoff between j, ,againbeing given by (34). This is identical to the optimal pol-
icy under white noise disturbances.
C. Uncertain Perceptions
Thus far, we have assumed that private agents are clear in their perceptions of whether
the observed disturbances are permanent shifts or only transitory shocks. Of course in time
they may turn out to be wrong, but our assumption is that agents can form a subjective char-
acterization of them. Suppose instead, that agents are unable to decide whether a disturbance
which has occurred represents a permanent shift or only a transitory shock. Assume thatthey
formalize their uncertainty by assigning probabilities 9, 1 —9say, respectively, to these two
outcomes.'° In the case where private agents observe u,v, the expected exchange rate is
9zt =—
1— — is2
and the analysis can be carried out by substituting this expression into (20). In thiscase it can
be shown that if 9 <1,perfect stabilization about the frictionless level of output is not possible.
On the other hand, if private agents do not observe u, v, we have seen that the rules(32a),
(32b), together with (34) replicate the frictionless economy perfectly for both white noise or
permanent shifts. This rule will therefore yield perfect stability irrespective of the private
agents' perceptions of the nature of the shocks (i.e., for all values of 9).
6. ANTICIPATED DISTURBANCES
As another example, suppose that at time t-l agents perfectly anticipate all disturbances
for time t (but not necessarily beyond). In the case of the instantaneously observed variables,
this means, for example q_1 =q;while for the potentially unobserved variables22
=E(vThat is, no new information on vt is forthcoming between time t-l and t, so that
the one-period prediction equals the future (noisy) observation. It thenfollows that
z_1 =E(z)so that (20') reduces to
Yt —yl=(I ) (1 —r)(p. + a2) (e+j,t — (20")
In this case, perfect stabilization about the frictionless economy can be easily accomplishedin
either of two ways:
(i) full wage indexation, r =1;
(ii) a monetary policy rule with P2=
Theoperation of the indexation rule can be seen by comparing (1 4d) with (1 4e). Full
indexation eliminates the dependence of output on price movements, so that
a
1—0 ______ Yt(0)[E(v)— 1'9]+Vt
That is, employment and output depend primarily upon the change in the forecast of the sup-
ply shock between time t-l and t. If v_1 =E(v)then
=n(l—0)E(v) + v =yf
implying perfect stabilization about the frictionless level of output.
Alternatively, the monetary policy rule
=js1e —a2etj,e+ /-3'- + jt4q




The deviation in output about the frictionless level therefore depends upon the unanticipated
change in the current exchange rate. In general, (e —e_1)depends upon: (i) the unantici-23
pated components of the exogenous disturbances and (ii) any revisions toexchange rate
expectations formed at time t. The assumption that the disturbances are correctly anticipated
eliminates the former effect, while by adopting an intervention rule withP2 =—, themone-
tary authority eliminates the effects of the latter, which would otherwise impact through the
money market. Hence setting /2= 2' ensuresthat exchange rate expectations will be
correct, which in turn implies perfect stabilization of output about its frictionless level.
Further, setting the arbitrary parameters p =/43 = 2' /14 = 0,the money supply rule can be
written in the particularly simple form
m =—a2r
in which the domestic monetary authorities accommodatemovement in the demand for money
resulting from movements in the domestic interest rate.
An important aspect of these results is that in both cases the rule yieldsperfect stabiliza-
tion irrespective of change in exchange rate expectations between timet- 1 and time t. Since
such changes, if they occur, reflect private agents' perceptions of disturbancesoccurring at
that time, perfect stabilization of output is obtained irrespective of whetherthe shocks occur-
ring at time t are perceived at that time as being permanent or transitory.
7. WAGE INDEXATION
It is seen from the analysis of Sections 4-6 that for the adoptedpolicy specifications,
wage indexaijon is inessentjal. All of the optima can be reached by the adoption ofmonetary
policy alone. This is hardly surprising, given the asymmetry of information embodied inthe
monetary policy and wage indexation rules. At the same time we have shown thatwage
indexation alone can yield perfect stabilization in the cases of full informationand perfectly
anticipated disturbances. We now consider whether in the case of unanticipateddisturbances,
wage indexation rules, based on the same information as the above monetary rules, can
achieve the same equilibria. Specifically, we consider thewage indexation rule24





That is, wages are indexed to unanticipated changes in the foreign price level, the foreign
interest rate, the expected exchange rate, in addition to the domestic price level. Given PPP,
this rule is clearly an indexation analogue to the money supply rule (1 4c).
Repeating the previous analysis, we can show that with white noise disturbances, the
choice of intervention parameters r1, r2, r3, r4, enables the replication of the equilibria of the
previous equilibria to be obtained. The reason is that r2, r3, can eliminate the foreign variables
q, wt; r4 is irrelevant and r1 can be chosen by setting=0in (31) or (34). In the case where
private agents observe Ut,vt,only partial stabilization is obtained, while when neither private
agents nor the stabilization authority observe these disturbances, perfect stabilizationresults.
In the case of initially unanticipated, but perceived permanent disturbances, we cannot
get perfect stabilization about the frictionless economy with this more general wageindexation
scheme alone, as long as private agents observe Ut,Vt.While indexation can stabilize for u,
wthe elimination of the supply shocks requires monetary policy. However, the general-
ized wage indexation scheme can achieve perfect stabilization when Ut and v are not
observed by private agents.
The reason why wage indexation may, or may not, yield perfect stabilization can be seen
from the supply function. For this purpose, we can set expectations at time I —1 to zero. In
this case, the deviation in output about the frictionless level is
YtY1— [l_9][ w+ 1E]
which is the case that v is observed is modified to
1—9 V
Yt—Y( ePtWt+l+nO
In general, Pt 15 a function of more random variables than just v. When Vt IS observed, the25
wage indexation rule (42) contains insufficient independent parameters to stabilize for bothPt
and v exactly. With disturbances which are perceived to be permanent, the effect ofthe
optimal monetary rule (37a) is essentially to eliminate, through the adjustment ofexchange
rate expectations, the effects of all random variables other than v on the price level. Indeed,
the rule ensures that the real wage adjusts by precisely the amount v/(l + nO),thereby lead-
ing to the perfect stabilization of output about its frictionless level. But with transitory shocks,
exchange rate expectations do not adjust and monetary policy is also unable to achieve perfect
stabilization.
On the other hand, when v is not known, E (vi), inferred from the leastsquares predic-
tion (I 6b), is essentially a linear function of the observed disturbancesPt, Wt,qand rt, upon
which the wage indexation rule is based. It is not an independent variable andthe rule
includes sufficient parameters to neutralize all these random shocks.
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed the interdependence between the optimal degree ofwage index-
ation and optimal monetary policy for a small openeconomy. We have investigated this rela-
tionship under a variety of assumptions regarding: (1) the relative information availableto
private agents and the (public) stabilization authority; (ii) the perceived nature of the distur-
bances impinging on the economy. Several conclusions are worth highlighting.
First, if all agents have perfect information, then perfect stabilization can be achieved
either by modifying the Karni indexation rule by adjustingwages to the unanticipated change
in output, or by an appropriate but very simply specifiedmonetary rule.
Most of our attention has dealt with incomplete information. Where disturbancesare
unanticipated, we have drawn the distinction between those that are perceived as being transi-
tory (white noise) and those that are perceived as being permanent shifts. In the case of the
former, we find that the distortions due to the wage contract can be fully eliminated,thereby26
replicating the output of the frictionless economy, as long as private agents and the stabliza-
tion authority have the same (imperfect) information. On the other hand, for perceived per-
manent shifts, perfect stabilization is achieved whether or not private agents and the stabiliza-
tion authority have identical information. In the case where the information sets are identical,
there are two sets of policy rules which achieved perfect stabilization. We have also con-
sidered the situation in which private agents are unable to decide whether or not a distur-
bance which has occurred is permanent or transitory and show that with identical information
between private and public agents, perfect stabilization can be achieved. This is not so, how-
ever, where private agents have an informational advantage.
Finally, we have determined the optimal policies when disturbances are anticipated. We
have shown how perfect stabilization may be achieved either by fully indexing wages to prices
or by a simple rule accommodating the money supply to changes in the demand for money
arising from movements in the domestic interest rate. In both cases, the perfect stabilization
obtains irrespective of whether the disturbances are expected to be temporary or permanent.
Our analysis emphasizes the policy redundancy issue. That is, some of the policy coeffi-
cients can be set arbitrarily, enabling the policy rules to be specified in many equivalent ways.
In all cases wage indexation is inessential, in the sense that the equilibrium can be achieved
through monetary policy alone. While this is largely a consequence of relatively rich specifica-
tion of the monetary policy rule, this is not entirely so. In one important case, where private
agents have perfect information and perceive all shocks as being permanent, perfect stabiliza-
tion, which can be achieved through a very simple monetary policy rule, cannot be accom-
plished through wage indexation based on equivalent information.27
FOOTNOTES
*Theconstructive suggestions of two referees are gratefully acknowledged.
1.See e.g., Aizenman (1985), Marston (1984). There is also an extensive literaturedealing
with optimal exchange rate management (optimal exchange market intervention) innon-
indexed economics. See, e.g., papers in Bhandari (1985) and the references therein.
2.Suppose the nominal demand for money (specified in logarithms) is m =e+z,where
e =exchangerate (in logarithms) and z denotes all other variables. Wage indexation
becomes ineffective if the money supply m is adjusted by a rule of the formin =
3.We should note that, some authors, for example Flood and Marion (1982),assume that
the money supply follows a random walk. However, they do not address issues of
optimal stabilization policy.
4.Note that our analysis abstracts from input and input price shocks. Theseare con-
sidered by several authors. A recent paper by Aizenman and Frenkel (1986) considers
wage indexation and monetary rules in response to productivity and input shocks under
perfect information. Marston and Turnovsky (1985a) analyze alternativewage indexa-
tion rules in response to import price shocks, again under theassumption of perfect
information. By contrast, Marston and Turnovsky (l985b) analyze thecase where the
productivity disturbances are firm-specific. They show that if these are observed by the
firm alone, perfect stabilization of the economy can be attained by the combinationof a
wage indexation rule and a rather complicated taxation scheme.
5.This means that instantaneously the firm may not know its ownOutput. Of course once
v is observed, its output can be inferred, but the point is that this information may
become available only after the current production decision is made.
6.Note that our welfare criterion is precisely the same as that introducedby Aizenman




which in deviation form is
1 — E(v)
)p—w+1+n9
Minimizing var (y —yj)is equivalent to minimizing theloss function (31) of Aizenman
andFrenkel (1985).
7. Inaddition the general solutions for expectations et*+1,t include a term containing an arbi-
trary constant A say. This reflects the non-uniqueness of rational expectations solutions.
In the case of (2 Ia), A must be set to zero to ensure that the solution is stable. In the
case of (21b), however, stability considerations alone do not suffice to determine A.
This can be determined by invoking some additional restriction. Here we adopt the
"minimal state representation" procedure proposed by McCallum (1983) and widely used
(for some time) by others. This involves picking the rational expectations solution based
on the simplest solution and means that A =0,independent of stability considerations.
The notion that solutions are based on minimum information is appealing in that it
embodies the idea that forecaster use scarce information efficiently.
8.In (21b) =zfor j￿1, meaning that past values of z are known at time t. The
case where expectations are backward-looking, while consistent with rational expecta-
tions, is of less economic interest. In the cases we discuss, the expectations are always
forward-looking.
9.The fact that1 supports the claim made previously that full wage indexation is non-
optimal. It can be shown that the minimized (positive) variance obtained under this
optimal rule is less than what would be obtained under full wage indexation.
10. Since the disturbances we are considering are exogenous to the model this procedure is
perfectly consistent with agents having rational expectations.29
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possible times where u, v are observed
Fig. I
Timing of Information and DecisionsTABLE 1
UNANTICIPATED DISTURBANCES
White Noise Perceived Permanent Shifts
Private Agents /2arbitrary =i+c observeu, v /13= —a2
/12= /23= /1 arbit.,rr't,
= 2+/11 r arbitrarybut r1
(l+a2—p1)
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perfect stabilization perfect stabilization